



Department of Defense (DoD) Role in the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)



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Agenda




- Threats from Adversarial Foreign Investments
- Overview of U.S. Foreign Investment Review Mechanisms
 - CFIUS Overview
 - Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA)
 - CFIUS Processes
 - DoD's Role



Protect - Threats & Risks



Three Threat Avenues to Attack National Security and the Defense Industrial Base (DIB)



- Adversarial Capital is used to gain control over a firm's decision making.
- Threats can use numerous vectors: investments, mergers & acquisitions (M&A), employees' dual loyalties (talent programs), research partnerships, joint ventures, and espionage.
- Through these vectors, adversaries can leverage their position to gain access or control to force tech transfers, disrupt/infiltrate critical supply chains, or gain access to sensitive data for espionage.



Protect – Sources of Innovation



Adversaries are raising VC and early stage funds to target innovation hubs


Figure 2: Innovation hotspot scores (24 cities)



Source: Crunchbase, The Economist Intelligence Unit, The majority of innovation hubs are in the United States and its

Adoption of strong Foreign Investment Review Screening Regimes is essential to closing down threat avenues

partner and allied countries








Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)




FDI is a positive for the United States

- Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) allows foreign investment dollars to be used to benefit the United States.
- FDI supports 7.8m jobs directly, provides \$66.9B in R&D spending, and adds \$395.3B to U.S. exports.
- FDI is consistently ~20% of US GDP.



FDI into the U.S. by Region (2018-2019)



■2018 **■**2019

Largest Sources of FDI Fastest-Growing Sources of FDI in the United States (by UBO) in the United States (by UBO)

Rank	Market	2019 Position in USD millions	Share of total	Ran	k Mark
1	Japan	\$644,727	14.5%	1	Kowait
2	Canada	\$580,752	13.0%	2	Thailand
3	Germany	\$521,979	11.7%	3	Chile
4	United Kingdom	\$445,179	10.0%	4	Ireland
5	Ireland	\$343,538	7.7%	5	Brazil
6	France	\$310,743	7.0%	6	Bermuda
7	Netherlands	\$290,429	6.5%	7	Netherlands
8	Switzerland	\$224,368	5.0%	8	New Zealand
9	Australia	\$86,537	1.9%	9	Turkey
10	Spain	584,338	1.9%	10	Austria
11	Bermuda	\$77,140	1.7%	11	China
12	Belgium	\$70,073	1.6%	12	Colombia
13	Sweden	\$61,316	1.4%	13	Luxembourg
14	South Korea	\$61,135	1.4%	14	Singapore
15	Singapore	\$60,138	1.3%	15	Denmark

Rani	k Market	2019 Position In USD millions	2014-2019
1	Kowait	\$1,820	41.8%
2	Thailand	\$1,684	26.7%
3	Chile	\$3,431	21.7%
4 Ireland		\$343,538	20.3%
5 Brazil		\$45,273	19.6%
6	Bermuda	\$77,140	19.1%
7	Netherlands	\$290,429	17.1%
8	New Zealand	\$2,619	16.7%
9	Turkey	\$2,346	16.6%
10	Austria	\$5,250	15.3%
11	China	\$59,043	15.2%
12	Colombia	\$4,080	13.9%
13	Luxembourg	\$22,760	13.5%
14	Singapore	\$60,138	12.3%
15	Denmark	\$23,541	12.3%






FDI & Strategic Economic Competition



However, some countries leverage FDI to gain access to new capabilities.

- China's leaders seek to undermine the open and stable international system
 - · Distorts market forces
 - U.S. companies must not sacrifice American values
 - Sustained, strategic competition across multiple areas
 - · Economic, diplomatic, and technological
- United States balances economic prosperity and national security



- U.S. companies seek capital from China but risk losing control of intellectual property.
- The U.S. has vastly greater exposure to intangible assets (intellectual property).

Tangible vs. Intangible Assets for S&P 500 Companies, 1975-2018



The United States is the largest destination for FDI, with of \$3.3 trillion (2015) to \$4.4 trillion (2019) in position*.

China contributes a small amount, between 0.5% to 1% of total FDI position*, accounting for \$15 billion (2015) to \$38 billion (2019).

*Position is the snapshot of cumulative FDI taken at year end (Department of Commerce: https://www.selectusa.gov/)







Chinese Technology Transfers:
A Unified Strategy with Multiple Tactical Battlefields



CHINA CIRCUMVENTS U.S. INVESTMENT REGULATIONS AND EMPLOYS TACTICS AGAINST THE U.S. TO ACQUIRE U.S. ASSETS AND GAIN INSIDE ACCESS.

Key tactics include the following:

- Leveraging partnerships and joint ventures to gain intellectual property & force tech transfers
- Combining cyber campaigns with embedded personnel to collect sensitive information from R&D and tech firms
- Using private equity firms, shell companies to obscure Chinese state involvement
- Paying premiums for U.S. acquisitions (market distortion); targeting distressed U.S. through bankruptcy procedures
- Manipulating deals to reduce the U.S. target company's market value before acquisition

Early stage tech companies are vulnerable due to desire for quick funding and guaranteed exits.





Overview of U.S. Foreign Investment Review Mechanisms




CFIUS – Overview



The Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS) is an interagency committee authorized by law to review certain transactions involving foreign investment in the United States and certain real estate transactions by foreign persons, in order to determine the effect of such transactions on the national security of the United States.

CFIUS Legislative & Regulatory History > 2018: CFIUS jurisdiction expanded by the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 ("FIRRMA") Covered investments (Critical Technology, Emerging Technology, Critical Infrastructure, Sensitive Personal Data) Real estate transactions 1988: Exon-Florio **1975**: EO 11858 2007: FINSA 2018: FIRRMA Amendment **CFIUS Timeline Declaration National Security** Filing: 30 Days Investigation: 45 Days **National Security Presidential** Review: 45 Days **Determination: 15 Days**





CFIUS & FIRRMA Overview



CFIUS Goals & Key Attributes

- Protect national security from the risks presented by adversarial capital
- · National security risks, not other policy interests
- Transactions reviewed using a rigorous, analytical process
 - Each transaction has a unique risk profile
 - Based on threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences
- The approach is proportional in addressing national security risks.
 - CFIUS is a last resort uses other authorities first
 - Encourage alternate methods to mitigate risks
 - · Mitigation and monitoring solutions whenever possible
- Timely and efficient, with accountability and communication throughout
- Confidential

CFIUS Jurisdiction

- Transactions that result in a foreign entity taking control of a U.S. business
- Any transaction which results in a foreign entity taking a nonpassive investment in a U.S. business (aka TID business) that
 - Produces, designs, tests, manufactures, fabricates, or develops a critical [t]echnology
 - Owns, operates, manufactures, supplies, or services critical infrastructure
 - Maintains or collects sensitive personal [d]ata of U.S. citizens
 - Collectively referred to an "TID" businesses
- Certain real estate transactions
- Maritime and Air Ports
- Proximity to certain installations



FIRRMA Regulations





- "Other Investment" categories include non-controlling investments
 - Access to material information, board seat, or substantive decision making
- Controlling investments continue to fall under traditional CFIUS jurisdiction



Real Estate Investments

- Proximity/Extended Range
 - 1 mile radius for all installations
 - 100 mile radius for certain ranges
 - Key exclusions
 - -Urbanized areas and clusters
 - -Single family homes and commercial offices

Sensitive Personal Data



- Access to large amounts of data
- Targets or tailors to national security professionals



Critical Technology Regulations

- International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulation (EAR) controlled items
- Emerging and foundational technology under the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA)

<u>Critical Infrastructure</u>

- Communications networks, cable, fiber
- Defense Industrial Base including critical materials
- Energy production and distribution
- Financial services
- Transportation sea/air-ports and rail
- Water and wastewater systems





CFIUS Filings & Process





Risk Based Analyses

All acquisitions carry a risk profile, but each assessment is unique and varies based off information provided by the company and government stakeholder.



Mitigation

Forms:

- · Letter of Assurance
- · National Security Agreement
- Order
- Interim Measures

CFIUS works with parties on provisions to address risk and must be effective, enforceable, and monitorable.

Risk Identified

- CLEAR transaction
- Negotiate or impose MITIGATION
- Recommend PROHIBITION
- · International engagement

Mitigation

- Effective
- Monitorable
- Enforceable

Monitoring

- Notifications
- Annual Reporting
- Site Visits
- Third Party Audits
- Third Party Monitors

DoD Stakeholder Engagement to Assess Risks

All acquisitions carry a risk profile, but each assessment is unique and varies based off information provided by the company and government stakeholder.

Notice Filing (Joint Voluntary Notice or JVN) • Voluntary Filings ➤ Voluntarily file to seek "safe harbor" • Agency Filings ➤ In certain circumstances an Agency may file for the parties Clearance 45 Day Review 45 Day Investigation 15 Day POTUS Mitigation Blockage

Declarations

- Voluntary Declarations
- Mandatory Declarations:
- > A foreign person, substantially backed by a foreign government, or
- Foreign person making a covered investment that could result in foreign control of a TID U.S.
 business involved in critical technologies

30 Day Assessment

Complete All Action

File Notice, CFIUS or Parties request

Unilateral Review

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CFIUS Reviews & Risk Based Analyses (RBA)



Foreign Investment Review (FIR) interfaces with CFIUS

• Provides support to DoD stakeholders

FIR reviews transactions for Vulnerability & Consequences

- **Threat**: The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) provides threat reporting to CFIUS in a National Security Threat Assessment (NSTA), evaluating intent and capability of the threat
- **Vulnerability**: FIR analyzes the national security nexus of the US business, looks across operations, acquisitions, and sustainment
- Consequences: FIR analyzes and estimates any resulting impact of exploitation of vulnerabilities

DoD Stakeholder Engagement

- Ensure DoD equities represented on CFIUS
- Perform risk-based analyses
- Understand national security risks, threats, vulnerabilities, consequences

Example
Risks
Articulated in RBAs

Supply Chain Assurance: reducing or halting supply

Tech Transfer: access denial or transfer to adversary

Product Integrity: malicious component or software insertion

Colocation: on-going presence near installations

Sensitive Data: exploiting personal data for various types of espionage

f (Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence) = Risk

Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence combine to produce a Risk calculus.



Key Questions and Concerns

Is this technology critical to DoD?

- Defense unique technology or provides technological advantage or promising future applications
- Required to advance other technologies or used to improve/maintain system performance
- No substitutes available or specialized knowledge and skills required to design and manufacture

Is this company critical to DoD?

- Single qualified or sole source
- Needed to avoid foreign dependency or Needed to avoid supply disruption (capacity or availability)
- DoD investments in this company or independent research & development investment
- · High market share
- · Significant reconstitution cost and schedule
- Source of innovation, e.g. provides state of the art capabilities/processes/products/facilities

Can we protect this technology and/or company?

- Is CFIUS providing mitigation actions to protect the technology? Example: Executable Protection Plans
- Are the mitigation actions enforceable?
- What additional protection mechanisms are in place?
- Technology Area Protection Plans
- Export Controls
- Leverage USG policies, programs, and authorities to balance protection and promotion



Q&A



